How were 2011-2013 Russian Protests were Unsuccessful, and the Fair Elections were not Held
Abstract:
The 2011-2013 Russian protests were failed to achieve their intended objectives as they were characterized by a public uproar against corruption and tyrannical government systems. A significant number of people in Russia outrightly protested against Putin’s administration due to preliminary factors that were mostly attributed to lack of accountability and the gross misconduct of the president. The uproar was preceded by revolts made by the middle class in Russia who were later supported by people from different social classes due to the rising rate of corruption and tyranny. Putin’s rival, Alexei Navalny made relentless efforts to not only enlighten the public about their rights but also purposely engage in protests against the government. However, despite these efforts, Vladimir Putin still won the elections against his rival, Navalny. This paper outlines reasons that led to the short-lived protests that subsequently led to Putin’s leadership position. The main reason that led to the unsuccessful democratic demonstrations was the effective counteraction and management of the protests by Putin’s administration. He not only contained these demonstrations but also ensured that there would be limited occurrences of public uproars. Secondly, Putin’s administration ensured that none of the concerns outlined by the protestors were addressed and as such, the public was still suffering from oppression. Lastly, Putin’s administration ensured that the protests lost traction and as such, the number of people who participated in the public demonstration gradually declined. Essentially, Russia’s government fits the example of a nation whose leader fails to acknowledge the needs of the public and outrightly uses corrupt and oppressive means to retain power. The Russian protests against Putin and the larger political class failed largely since they failed to garner universal support from the larger Russian public. The protests also failed since majority of the Russian public with the exception of the young mostly concentrated within the urban region, failed to be swayed by Navalny. Research contextualizes Navalny, as an inept and politically immature of understanding the Russian political discourse.
Introduction
The Russian public discourse continues to battle calls for democracy against the increasingly powerful dictatorship spearheaded by strongman, Putin who has been the leader of the largest country in the world for nearly two decades. In the start of the last decade, many young Russians in frustration rushed to the streets in protest of yet another Putin’s win as the president of the Russian federation. Calls for fair election dominated the urban social discourse, spearheaded by internet sensation Alexei Navalny, who had garnered a large following through his critical expositions of Russian political class corruption. The 2011-13 protest were one of the largest in the country and as such garnered an international following. The essay below outlines why the protest despite all the credible foundation and large buildup failed.
Social mobilization happens in societies for many reasons; one major reason is because of communities losing a sense of control over their lives and seeking to recover this or some art of this loss (of control). The social movement theory is a social sciences interdisciplinary study that seeks to understand the reasons for social mobilization, their forms of manifestation, and the social, cultural, and political consequences of this mobilization (Azani, 2009). Social movements can be understood under various relevant theories, including resource mobilization theory, deprivation theory, structural strain theory, political process theory, and the new social movement theories. As per the deprivation theory, it posits that some social movements are born when certain groups or people within society feel they have been deprived of specific services, goods, or resources, of which depravation can be relative, where one group is disadvantaged relative to another, or absolute, where the affected groups’ grievances are in isolation from the position of that group in society. According to the resource mobilization theory, when specific people or groups within societies have grievances, they can mobilize the necessary resources to take some actions so that their grievances are alleviated (Sen and Avci, 2016). Resources include things such as social status, labor, media support, knowledge, and political elites.
Protest as such become successful in the event that they have clearly defined goals. They dictate the change they want to see. They also become successful when the protestors have the ability to consolidate and expound on their gains within the limited time from one victory to another. Furthermore, protests also become successful if they are inclusive of not just the people, but allies in power as well and finally protest become successful when they identify a framework to survive after their victory. Regardless of whether Navalny’s quest was justified or not, he had bitten more than he could swallow. He did not have an adequate plan to consolidate his gains across the country. This is despite the fact that his calls for protest resulted in some of the largest in the country’s modern history. Navalny did not have powerful allies and he was conceptualized as politically immature for the Russian state. Nonetheless, reviewing the context and manifestation of the protest allows for a great and holistic interpretation of the political system in the modern state of Russia.
The structural strain theory suggests that for a nascent social movement to grow, six factors are necessary; people within the society experience a problem – deprivation; the people in the society recognizing the existence of the problem; the development and spread of an ideology that purports to be a solution to the problem; an event/ events transpiring to convert the nascent social movement into an authentic social movement; the society and its form of government are open to change to facilitate the effectiveness of the movement,; and resource mobilization that occurs as the movement further develops/ grows (Sen and Avci, 2016). The political process theory holds that social movements are a form of political movements whose origins can be traced to political opportunities being available, and so movements are viewed in the context of the state and state power. As per this theory, if the government has a strongly entrenched position that is prone to repressive behavior, then there are high chances that social movements might fail. The new social movements’ theories posit the look at the other collective action motivators rooted in ideology, politics, and culture and focus on new collective identities such as gender, ethnicity, and sexuality to understand what causes collective actions (Sen and Avci, 2016). Based on the mentioned theories, social movements are either deemed to succeed, or fail in the event that some conditions do not led social movements grow.
Social protests are social movements that take on the form of political expression with the goal(s) of bringing about political or social change through influencing attitudes, knowledge, and the policies of institutions/ organizations, and behaviors of the public. Social movements are not entirely a new phenomenon but remain complex social phenomena that work according to several models, with their characteristics and nature differing across eras and societies (Katz, 2004). While some political protests (as social movements) succeed and meet their objective, usually to bring about change, there are several others that do not succeed, and whose long-term success is not possible, despite initially achieving success (Thornton, 2010). An example is the Arab Spring, where massive protests succeeded in bringing down regimes and changing leaders/ leadership; however, almost a decade later, the status quo has largely been restored, or there is utter chaos. Stark examples are Egypt and Libya; the protests in Egypt brought about political change, removed a long serving president (Hosni Mubarak), and ushered democratic elections (won by the Muslim Brotherhood). Less than two years later, there was a reversion to the familiar, a military coup, deposing of a democratically elected leader, and ‘managed elections’ in which the incumbent military leader won elections and swift reforms to entrench himself in power. In Libya, the removal of Gadhafi, a long serving dictator was a success, but the country is in utter chaos, raising questions whether protests and the revolution was necessary in the first place (Robinson, 2020).
Among the reasons why protests fail, looking at China and particular incidences as an example is because of loose leadership and organization of these protests, lack of control over the media image by the protesters, and the absence of policy advocates, for example, Non-Governmental organizations. Those that succeed do so because the protest is effectively framed by the media, there is sufficient media coverage, and involve many participants with strong leadership and an accommodating political (government) system (Qin, 2017). According to Naím (2014), political/ street protests rarely work because while social media makes it easy to mobilize thousands or even millions and create solidarity, there is usually no well-oiled, organized, and permanent organization that is capable of following up on the demands of protesters and undertaking the often complex, face to face dull political activity that results in real institution or government changes. Consequently, most street political protests end up in violent confrontation or an acknowledgement of the protestor’s grievances (with very little or no action afterwards, and the political protests eventually just fizzle out.
This proposal seeks to analyze the 2011-2013 Russian protests (known popularly as the Snow Revolution), why it failed to achieve its objectives, with elections still being deemed unfair/ substandard in as far as democratic standards are concerned. The Russian protests were the largest ever conducted in Russia by that time (Grigorii, 2012). The large-scale nature of the protests, the spirit of the people in mobilizing for the protests, and their relentlessness even in the face of the government’s retaliation was impressive. The protests were characterized by widespread mobilizations, enabled by an uprise of social networks, which was in turn made possible by social and technological advancements. At the time, the social networks were uncensored and ubiquitous, making it easy to network and mobilize. Thus, the protests, which took place physically, were triggered by discussions of grievances by liberal masses on online platforms (Denisova, 2017). The mobilizations were fundamental in bridging the gap between the government’s view and the reality of resistance. Russian journalists, political activists, and liberal masses, as well as foreigners, were behind the mobilizations, pointing out the flaws in the election process. The protests were demanding for fair elections, while resisting Vladimir Putin’s re-election to power. Grievances against Putin and his party, United Russia, were the focal point in the protests. Granted, the mobilizations were effective, and the protests, which started out as simple demonstrations, became the largest in the history of Russia. An exploration of the political scene indicates that the Putin protests in 2011-2013 failed, although the people were sure that the election outcome did not reflect the true picture of the people’s voice. Putin won regardless of the protests due to his counter measures that ensured he eliminated resistance by targeting the opposition leaders and oppressing them to discourage them from mobilizing the masses.
Thesis Statement:
The 2011-2013 Russian protests failed to achieve their objectives largely they lacked a clear program for following up on the struggle in fight Russia’s new authoritarianism.
Research Question:
What made the 2011-2013 Russian protests fail yet they were designed to improve the democratic space and the social well-being of the citizens?
Structure:
The literature review will be built on the research topic through three main arguments. The first argument raised will be that the impact of the 2011-2013 protests was short-lived. Secondly, the paper will explore the argument that the long-term trend of political unrest and oppression continued even after the 2011-2013 elections. The last argument raised is that the Russians never staged any other political protests of similar magnitude or more after the 2011-2013 protests failed.
Literature Review
Introduction
The prior studies indicate that the 2011-2013 protests were large-scale and remarkable, but they were unsuccessful in stopping unfair elections. Anti-Putinism tested Putin’s dominance in Russia, but he proved stronger than protests and overcame the wave. A study gap in this analysis concerns the in-depth exploration of how such high magnitude protests failed to achieve the objective of making Russia more democratic. It is apparent that the protests’ magnitude was the largest ever seen in Russia, however, the protests did not achieve their intention due because Putin remained in power regardless of the allegations of unfair elections. Many studies allude to the failure of the revolution, such as (Denisova, 2016), (Tertytchnaya, 2019), (White and McAllister, 2013), and (Robertson, 2013), they discuss the events, the effects of social media, and the power of Vladimir Putin, but disagree or do not delineate WHY the protests fail, and this is the objective of this proposed research; to establish why the protests failed, and the nature and causes of the failure. This particular protest and topic has been selected given the unique circumstances of Russia; it is technically a Democratic Federation, and should have democratic institutions in place; it is also a former super power and a major geo political power in the global geo political landscape. Its circumstances are also unique because it has a president that is close to serving two ten year terms (nonconsecutive), having been a Prime Minister in between and ensured his ‘choice’ of President Dmitry Medvedev served as president before replacing the president with himself. Putin continues to exercise a lot of influence in Russia and the world, at present and in the future, and is a classical Big Man common to dysfunctional democracies in Africa and not for a first/ developed world democracy like Russia. This research will help shed light on why political protests like the Snow Revolution fail, based on social movement theories and past findings by other researchers.
The 2011-2013 protests were characteristic of the environment in Russia’s post-communist politics; authoritarian or dysfunctional democratic processes- and the Snow Revolution aimed at ending the years of unfair elections in Russia and ensure the people’s civil rights were upheld. Initially, the voice of the middle-class were ignored in favor of the society’s elite (Greene, 2014). The silent oppression of the country’s people under the past regimes was envisioned to have come to an end when the people were finally bold enough to go to the streets and protest the unfair treatment (Nicu, 2012). This was a massive protest triggered by anti-Putin sentiments, and supported by the Russian citizens with the hope of ending an era of political oppression and unrest in the country. Although this was a bold move, which was successful and a significant step towards opposing Putin’s political regime, the protests were unsuccessful and the elections held were unfair (Balmforth, 2012). Moreover, Putin’s government retaliated effectively, mitigating the protests, and ensuring they do not recur. Hence, the 2011-2013 elections were unsuccessful, and fair elections not held.
In the article Alexei Navalny and challenges in reconciling “nationalism” and “liberalism” by Marlene Laruellea identifies that part of the reason why the protest also failed was because Alexei Navalny’s entry into the scene found a complicated environment in trying to reconcile his views of nationalism with modes of liberalism as such, his message became unpalatable for the larger public, with the exception of the middle class young people who were increasingly tired of Putin inaction and lack of growth. Characteristically, nationalist modes of thinking still dominate large portions of Russian political ideological systems, and constitute how the Russian politically conscious idolize their government when comparing their government with the west. Liberal ideals have also started to gain significance within the Russian middle class. Laruellea (2013) identifies that Navalny lacked an no inherent theoretical contradiction with the current regime, being a thinker and not a doer and majorly being motivated by numbers.
The more followers he could get, the better it would be for his political ambitions. Laruellea (2013) opine that “He is thus not interested in theoretical constructions and refuses to engage in debate over what can be identified as contradictory stances.” (279). Dollbaum et al in the article A top-down movement with grass-roots effects? Alexei Navalny’s electoral campaign agrees with this perspective stating that his message appeared to be strategically written to trap certain kep population segments first the country’s liberal opposition, and then the larger nationalist middle class. Laurellea (2013) identifies that nationalism in Europe has generally gone hand in hand with democracy, and this is also a key trend that Navalny was tapping into. Dollbaum (2018) identifies that “liberals were wooed by demands for cutting the bureaucratic apparatus and abandoning taxes for small enterprises. Finally, the nationalist rhetoric of Navalny’s earlier public speeches was virtually absent – the only remaining element was the demand for a visa regime with the former Soviet republics in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.” (4). This positions him with major contradictory issues in his policies and creates room for skeptics. Laruellea (2013) identifies that “For some time Russian nationalism had been limited to two main ideological trends, namely ethno-nationalism and Eurasianism, with the latter being divided into two strands, the Eurasianists proper and those who are nostalgic for the greatness of the imperial and/or Soviet past” (278). Navalny’s entry and ideologies were rather obscure and harder to understand for western and even Russian pundits. Laruellea (2013) identifies that Navalny’s motivation was political and not centered on the theoretical construction of ideologies. This can be explained through his rise, starting off as a liberal, before being thrown out of the Yabloko party, then shifting to nationalism, before being targeted by security forces and finally settling on independency and targeting corrupt people.
The western models of liberalism had largely failed to make an impact to the people in Russian in part due to government propaganda and increased sense of nationalism that took over Russia after the failure of the soviet union. Navalny’s position was initially conceptualized as a proliberal candidate, but some within the Russian state increasingly started to view his bid in parallel to that of socialist Germany. Laruellea (2013) identifies that his bid was increasingly criticized and dismissed as “Navalny’s Myth” in part because they compared his “success to that which brought Hitler to power, boosted by xenophobic middle classes tired of the previous regime….He nevertheless occupies a paradoxical position because many among the upper and middle classes in Moscow tired of the Putin status quo do not appreciate the character, his working-class directness, and are concerned about this overly personalized and potentially populist figure” (278-280). As such, Navalny is not really conceptualized as a breath of fresh air to the Russian public, but a potential challenger of Putin, who will only reinstate the status quo. This is majorly a reason why he also lost the elections. Moen-Larsen (2013) in the article Normal nationalism”: Alexei Navalny, LiveJournal and “the Other argues that if Navalny is a nationalist, or a liberal, then he has never argued or been compelled in his motives to outline his message.
The Facts and Arguments
Argument
The 2011-2013 Russian protests failed to achieve the intended objectives. While they were meant to improve the democratic space and the social well-being of the citizens, elections are still considered unfair and below the required standards of a democracy. Despite having huge support from the masses, the protests lacked a clear program on the roadmap to be followed to achieve electoral justice in the country. However, regardless of the protests, Putin still won the elections, majority of the opposition leaders have been jailed, and there is barely anything to show.
Argument 1: The impact of the 2011-2013 protests was short-lived
A. This introduces the aspect of false dawns in Russia’s politics, which has been a norm in Russia’s struggle for democracy (Robertson, 2014). This is termed as a snow evolution, whose impact lasts for a while before fading away. Russia was successful in mobilizing citizens for the protests through social networks, leading to the largest protests ever seen in the country since the 1990s. The opposition was successful in creating a significant impact on the society, both externally and internally. However, Putin reacted to the protests through counter-protests, which were highly effective. He used oppression to discourage the protests, and the opponents were intimidated, such that they gave up on the protests. Their goal of ensuring fair elections that express the people’s voice was unsuccessful, as Putin was still sworn in as the President. Autocrat survival plays a significant role in undermining the impact of protests, regardless of their magnitude. This was the case in Russia, regarding the 2011-2013 protests.
B. The protest highlighted electoral irregularities and its goal was to have the country hold another election, but this did not happen (David, 2012). Lankina and Skovoroda (2016) point out that electoral fraud plays a significant role in triggering protests among the local people. This was the case in Russia, where the post-electoral protests reflected the people’s dissent and dissatisfaction with the electoral outcome. Although elections indicate a democratic process where people exercise their right to choose leaders, irregularities undermine the people’s right by imposing a leader on the people. Another goal of the protests was to free political prisoners, but this did not happen. Rather, the country saw an increase in the number of political prisoners, as the leaders of the protests were arrested and charged falsely, in a bid to undermine the protests. No investigations were made into the election flaws allegations to determine their legitimacy, and Putin maintained that the elections were valid. The move to conduct new open and democratic elections was not achieved either. Another objective of the protests was to register opposition parties, in a bid to enhance democracy.
C. The December protests’ impact did not last long, as the President was still sworn into power. Different youth rallies such as Young Guard and Nashi conducted counter-protests to support the government. The “For Fair Elections” was a pro-government protest that was conducted to counter the protests going by the same name in 2012. The anti-Orange protests, and the “For Fair Elections” were significant pro-government protests that supported the Putin, leading to his successful inauguration in May 2012. Having maintained the situation by reiterating and arresting his opponents, Putin was inaugurated without an audience in Moscow. Such levels of impunity characterize authoritarian leadership style, and the people in power have in place institutions that empower them to achieve their goals (Wright, 2008). For Putin, elections were his weapon against his opponents, as he used a process that is meant to be free and fair, a mark of democracy that determines the will of the people, although he knew he would manipulate the outcome to ensure he is declared the winner. He also had the legislature in his palm, since they swore him in illegally amidst the chaos of the protests.
Argument 2: The long-term trend of political unrest and oppression continued even after the 2011-2013 elections.
A. The oppression increased, with government opposition getting in trouble with the law for standing out for civil rights. Protesters were beaten and imprisoned unfairly and openly, with the president declaring that the protesters would be killed through his secretary’s press release. Authoritarian rule involves dictators that impose their desires on the people regardless of the interest of democracy. This makes the leaders vulnerable to the mass threats often depicted through public demonstrations and protests the authoritarian rule thus raising a fundamental conflict in the society (Svolik, 2012). The Russian protests aimed at threatening the regime of Putin as an authoritarian leader in the country in search of democracy. In June 2012, new laws were put in place that enacted strict boundaries, limiting the people’s freedom in conducting protests. On June 2012, the homes of key activists such as Sergei Udaltsov, Aleksey Navalny, and Kseniya Sobchak were raided one day before holding an organized demonstration. In the raid, the houses were searched and valuables such as funds, names of supporters, electronic data, and literature were seized. Moreover, the protest leaders were summoned by the Investigative Committee of Russia on the day of the demonstrations. This discouraged them from proceeding for fear of adverse ramifications. Moreover, anti-Putin individuals were discouraged from mobilizing due to heavy penalties imposed on protestors. Having unauthorized the protests, Russians became intimidated and alienated, and this environment discouraged further action.
B. Electoral irregularities continue to mark the politics of Russia. To date, Russia is criticized for violating the people’s fundamental rights through its authoritarian policies that are oppressive and dictatorial in nature (Sakwa, 2014). Although the political environment of Russia affects its foreign affairs, the government has managed to camouflage under democratic ideologies over the years, making its relations with the outside world tolerable. Nevertheless, other nations criticize Russia for its various autocratic measures. Lankina and Skovoroda (2016) suggest that protests that target individual frauds and perpetrators are highly effective. This was the case for Russia during the 2011-2013 protests, which targeted Putin and his administration. However, the autocrat, Putin, survived the attack and managed to threaten the people enough to ensure they did not participate in any political protests in the future. Electoral irregularities are still a reality in Russia, where votes and elections are not held fairly. The elections reflect the concept of the failure of the 2011-2013 protests in Russia.
C. The call for Putin’s resignation was not effective as he managed to resist it by using force, even after he had sworn himself into office without being elected fairly. Some autocrats survive in authoritarian regimes because of existing political institutions that help them to curb the threats of the opponents. Gandhi (2008) notes that democratic political institutions, such as legislatures comprising of some of the opponents are effective in ensuring autocrats survive in authoritarian regimes. The goal of such political institutions is to broaden the support system for the authoritarian leaders among the country’s decision makers. The institutions mask the true intentions of the people in power, giving them a legal way of oppressing and undermining opponents without attracting too much criticism from the international community for being overly autocratic.
Argument 3: The Russians never staged any other political protests of similar magnitude or more after the 2011-2013 protests failed
A. The 2011-2013 protests triggered interrogations and arrests that are still ongoing, with several people being sentenced for their role in the protests, years later (Dollbaum, 2019). Dictators use threats and force to gain advantage over their subjects (Robertson, 2011). Publicizing the terrorist acts of the leaders against the people creates fear among the opposition, deterring future protests, even when the oppression continues. This is their way of managing dissent and ensuring the people remain voiceless for fear of adverse consequences for peaking out against political injustices. Rather than reforming, Putin misused his power to avoid any opposition. Rampant arrests coerced the opposition leaders to stop the protests. They also discouraged the citizens from participating in the organized demonstrations, for fear of being sentenced and imprisoned. Since the arrests and interrogations are still ongoing, they act as a reminder to the citizens to desist from political protests due to the long-term adverse effects. In most cases, the charges and allegations are false, meant to intimidate and oppress the opponents. Putin has managed to maintain his leadership role due to this strategy.
B. The 2011-2013 protests are unmatched in their magnitude, since the Russians have never gone back to the streets to demand for their rights again. This is especially the case for protests aimed at political justice, although social protests are held. Wright (2008) indicates that military regimes such as Putin’s government in Russia, create governing institutions that control their power, thus tending to establish binding legislatures that are like those seen in democratic regimes. Rather than depending on bloody authoritarianism, they use non ideological authoritarianism, whereby the leaders, although illiberal, can retain good relations with foreign powers by instituting democratic structures within their countries. Although they kill and oppress the people, they tend to conceal it as a part of their law, accusing the opposition falsely for various offences. Moreover, targeting the key opposition leaders works better in retaining the autocrats, rather than resorting to mas murder of the public. The opposition in Russia was fractured and incapable of protecting the interests of the citizens. The only positive outcome of the protests was the creation of the Opposition Coordination Council (OCC) in June 2012, through an election. The main aim of the council was to create an organized and coordinated manner of dissent through authorized means.
C. This indicates that the protests were a failed activism, and Russia continues to hold unfair elections that do not reflect the true voice of the people (Volkov, 2015). The issue of running democratic façades within an authoritarian government is successful in ensuring the dictatorship continues without interference from the people (Gandhi, 2008). The opposition leaders live in fear of their lives because of the oppression they go through when they are caught. Thus, the people remain voiceless and powerless in the face of such demeanor, empowering the autocrats to run the country without any proper checks in place. The political system in Russia is hybrid in nature, with elements of both autocracy and democracy. However, the nation presents itself as a democratic nation, making it appear democratic to the outside world, although it embraces several autocratic measures such as controlling the elections and limiting the opposition (Petrov et al., 2014).
The facts of the Snow Revolution can be argued based on social movement theories; for instance, social/ political protests as per the political process theory, enabling political opportunities must be present for political social movements to succeed. In this case, the Russian Government has a strongly entrenched position with repressive power and the big-man dispensation, and so it was bound to fail. As per the resource mobilization theory, the protests lacked political elites to keep the movement strong, and media support at the Russian level was not very strong. As per the structural strain theory, the necessary conditions of having a society and its government that is open to change was sorely lacking, and the protests, despite being very large and popular, had little chance of succeeding in meeting their objectives. The protests failed to achieve their objectives, and as per Naím (2014), political street protests are largely useless; they lack an organized, committed, and strong organizational structure that will perform follow-up on the protest and engage in the long, often boring and frustrating political negotiation process, usually with wielders of power not keen on giving away anything to the protestors, especially if it erodes their power or the power of the ‘big man’ at whose behest they work.
To be considered successful, the Snow Revolution should have resulted in significant changes in electoral systems and the democratic process in Russia; instead, the former Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, having also served as president for a decade, was the puppeteer behind the scenes, controlling the democratic space (as Big Men do) and ended up running for president in an election characterized by irregularities and abnormalities, including arrests of critics and opposition leaders (Evans, 2011). Vladimir Putin still exhibits the political characteristics attributed to his loved sport, judo (for which he has a black belt) – aggression and guile (BBC News, 2020). The lack of recognized leadership, extensive media framing of the protests and media coverage, as well as a lack of an organized structure to follow-up on the protests is postulated to be the main reasons why the protests failed, based on the social movement theories and the evaluation of the facts and events of the Snow Revolution.
Research Design
The research will be conducted as an extensive review of past literature, grounded on social movement theories, with a focus on the impact of the 2011-2013 Russian protests, their outcomes, and lessons from the protest in wider global context; why do some political protests fail, and for those that succeed, the success is short lived? A review of credible and scholarly resources gathered from the year 2011-2020 will be used to explore the research questions and draw inferences on the significance of the 2011-2013 protests. Information will be collected from credible sites such as Google Scholar to give a valid picture of the protests and their influence on the political scene in Russia. To obtain credible materials, key words such as ‘Russia Protests’, ‘Russia elections’, ‘impact of the 2011-2013 Russian protests’ will be used. Importantly, only materials from credible sources such as journals, newspapers articles, and government/non-governmental institutions will be used. A qualitative analysis of the findings, in comparison to those for the countries where the protests were successful, will then be conducted to draw inferences. The qualitative method that will be used in this case is the case study method. This method is preferred because it is not only efficient, but also relatively cheap and affordable. Moreover, the method takes a short time to complete, hence it is not time-consuming. This makes it an easy and efficient method of obtaining data for investigating a given phenomenon.
A comparison of the 2011-2013 protests in Russia against other protests with the authoritarian regime will also be made to further explore the research question. This theme is considered important as it forms a strong foundation for understanding the importance of democracy, and the challenges encountered in the modern society in the attainment of social justice. The Ukranian protests are a good inflection point that could be used to compare and contrast why the Russian protests failed. The research uses credible academic and public information that outline the success of the Ukranian protests named Ukranian Revolution of Dignity or the Euromadian to evaluate the factors that created its successes and utilize this to contrast with the Russian protests and identify where they went right and the failures they encountered.
Some of the major theoretical frameworks and contradictions that would be used to understand why the protests succeeded in some ways, and failed in other regards include the nationalistic, liberal, democratic frameworks. The essay also takes a look at the motivations and political history of Navalny and how his message resonates with the public overtime, and factors that made him liked and despised alike in his position as a National-Democrat (Nastdem). This will be done through an analysis on his frameworks for tapping votes. Concentrating on defining his modes of functionality in trying to conjure the Russian public as an imagined community, and how his works trying to compel the Russian public to be angry with the failures of their government motivated his message and made Navalny resonate with many across the Russian public.
The essay will also take a look at how social value systems within Russia are shaped by paying homage to Barth’s theory on community and identity formation. His theory on imagined communities gives an important perspective to how Navalny was able to gain a larger public following despite being limited to social media, after all national television stations were barred from giving him publicity, Larruellea (2013) for example argues that as of 2018, 51% of Russians had come to know Navalny despite having a very restricted exposure with the public. Finally, an important perspective would be comparing prior protests within Russia and how they in turn shaped the government and stifled opposition parties. This includes the market reform protest in the 1990s that succeeded against democracy protests within the same period that failed and why they failed in the Russian context.
Empirical Analysis
Protest Comparison Ukranian and Russian Perspective
Around the same time as the protests in Russian were failing, Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity was starting, and unlike the Russian protests, the Ukranian protests had succeeded. There are a variety of similarities between the two faction of protestors that compel a comparison in outcomes so as to adequately evaluate some of the reason, why Navalny’s bid failed. Shveda and Ho (2016) identify that majority of the protests in Ukraine were initially led by young people, and initiated as a grassroot level mainly sustained on social media platforms. Their grievances were similar to the participants in the Russian protests although with greater geopolitical motivations and implications. Their grievances were mainly centered around government in activity, increased corruption, poor service delivery, and their continued stance by Azarov government to angle its policies towards a pro-Russian perspective as opposed to the polity’s pro-European policy shift. Shveda and Ho (2016) reinstate that the protests started after “President Yanukovych unilaterally delayed the signing of the European Union Association Agreement. Thus, it was the abrupt policy shift from Pro-European to Pro-Russian… that propelled the thousands of demonstrators (predominantly young students) to go out onto the streets.” Similar events were being witnessed in Russia, and had become sustained over a long time especially among the Russian middle class. Then what caused the failure in Russian protest and a success in Ukranian protests?
Majorly, it is because the Ukranian protests had a strong vision and mission and larger support by the masses. Prior democratic protests had failed in Russia critically because there was limited public compulsion to participate enmasse, a greater lack of vision centered on an ideology. In this case, Navalny’s political protest lacked a major ideology, when compared to the Ukranian protest that was heavily centered on democratic rights of the people and their growth as a society compelled with a shift in policies from socialist Russia to democratic Europe. Aslund (2009) identifies this is also a primary reason why prodemocratic revolutions aimed at changing the Russian political structures failed in the past, while the pro-market revolutions succeeded. Mainly because, they were anti-revolutionary revolts by the people. Aslund (2009) opine that “One of the peculiarities of this Russian revolution was that it was anti-revolutionary, as was the democratic revolution in Eastern Europe in 1989, and was directed against the socialist revolution of 1917. The revolutionaries longed not for utopia but for “a normal society,” which meant a wealthy Western European society” (7). The Ukranian protests were sustained and hard huge collective actions, throughout the country, creating a greater panic among the predominant political structures.
Ukrainian participants also had greater unity propelled by a need for the creation of a statehood identity not anchored on soviet past and socialist ideals of the Russian state. As such, their effects were far reaching beyond its borders, as they gained support of most countries in Europe and the US, while the other faction was supported by Russia (who were the first to interfere and main catalyst in activation of the revolution in Ukraine). The intensity of the revolt in Ukraine was also very high, and unfolded within a shorter time and motivated by government irrational action on protestors. Across the 19th and 20th century most european countries revolution saw nationalist ideals go hand in hand with building democracy. Laruelle (2013) identifies that Navalny’s aim in Russia aimed “to reinscribe Russia within the European framework. Nationalism and democracy have advanced in tandem in European history, and nationalism has no predetermined political orientation, merging easily with the politics of both the left and the right” (277). In the context of the Ukranian state, nationalism, had no predetermined political orientation and easily merged with politics in the right as well as those of the left bringing more people to the forefront of the revolution. Ideals of a new statehood were the more common end goal that propagated their revolution. Shveda and Ho (2016) agree with this perspective stating that “the most salient reason for the revolution is the failure of the new (post-Soviet) political elites in reforming Ukraine and building up a new statehood.” Russian protests were unique as nationalist ideals had been embedded with certain political orientations synonymous with the west, and had contrary belief systems to the current Russian political value system. Laruelle (2013) identifies that most of these differences were contributed by the man at the helm of the opposition campaign in Russian. Navalny was majorly viewed as a doer and not a thinker. His policies at time contradicted his own vision and made him easily dismissable to the larger Russian public even the middle class who supported him.
How exactly did the Snow Revolution fail despite various weaknesses in the powerful Russian Political Class? Why did it Fail?
The Russian state is a powerful and very convoluted machinery in how it works and gains support, especially to the outsider with an aim to know how Putin remains relevant within Russia but elsewhere in the West, remains to be largely disregarded as a legitimate democratic leader. To understand why the Snow Revolution of 2011-13 failed it is important to take a look at how the Russian people are contextualized within their geopolitical space, how they view the Russian state and generally the demography of people living within cities and countryside within Russian and how they all relate to the Russian Federation. Without a doubt there is a festering wave of change manifesting within the Russian Federation. Stanovaya et al (2020) identifies that the 2011-13 revolution marked the crossroad of Russian Federation ineptness among the more urban populations of the Russian federation.
The revolution was brought about mainly through voices of dissent among people who were immensely critical of the authoritarian strength of the Russian political establishment. Additionally, most of the Navalny’s supporters were young and very new to the concept of fighting for power the older generation had been put through in their Soviet years and now arguably tired. Stanovaya et al (2020) identifies that the revolution manifested and spread within the federation mainly because great internal weaknesses in the heavily controlled political system were becoming more and more exposed for their fragmentation, among the general population. This was especially more expressed among the younger population within major Russian urban centers. Judah (2013) identifies that Alexei Navalny’s followers were made up of young people mainly less than two decades old and majority of them were not around to witness the Soviet Union, and its antics. Their ideas on governance were not defined under the pretext of the world war, east-west tug of war and the cold war but by globalization and political ideas in the 21st century.
Navalny’s Failure and Lack of Vision
Similar to the Ukranian revolution, the Russian revolution were motivated by ideals of a new statehood, mostly envisioned by young people that sought to decry the soviet ideals in favor of democracy, liberalism and nationalism. Navalny in one of the 2011 protests reinforced this view by sharing some of the polity’s frustrations in the statement he made “The time has come to throw off the chains. We are not cattle or slaves. We have a voice and we have the strength to defend it” (BBC, 2011). His vision for the most part, worked to appeal majority of the people and centered not on their political orientations but ideals of liberalism and democracy. But his own identity and history would work to bring about alternative ideas into his platform that for the most part created greater skepticism. Navalny was successful in creating and sustaining social identities of the new people who had alternative perspective of where they wanted their state to go.
Barth defined cultural differences as the otherness of one group from another. In this regard Jamieson (2005) states that “Barth observed that the creation and maintenance of social boundaries is an effortful activity involving cognition and coordinated social action. In other words, boundaries are created in ideas, thought, talk and writing, discourse that creates consequential difference and division” (190). Showing that immense social actions goes into the process of defining cultural values. This means that any opposition to the defined values work to create fear or moral panic. This is because it seeks to dissociate the strongly held beliefs of one society creating an element of uncertainty. This is a major tool that Navalny used and through its application in the social media, he was able to create a larger following. Moen-Larsen (2013) identifies that while Navalny managed to garner a larger following, his earlier nationalist views had attracted a sizable xenophobic mood of the new middle class and to some it pointed towards “the towards the arguments that contribute to Navalny’s popular appeal. It is a unique exploratory in-depth study of the writings of a political figure in whom many are interested, but whose nationalist discourse is less widely understood” (549).
From the resource mobilization theory perspective, Navalny had little to no grasp on how to formulate and consolidate support beyond his critical opposition to Putin, and messages of disapproval for Putin. This is something that Putin, on the contrary, possessed through access to media, state machinery such as police and even support from the polity through the development of the “Big man” image (which appealed to the polity) and the Russia vs West perspective which resonated with the population. Eidelman (2013) identifies that Navalny had been restricted from any major television and Billboard adverts in major cities such as Moscow. He applied the use of private media and internet to progress his message. Collective behavior, form the basis for most social movement such as the one Navalny had initiated manifest. Collectivist behavior are characterized by a variety elements such as emotions, enthusiasm, rumors, social contagion and mass hysteria among other things. This thus make them very uncertain and likely to be unstable to social movements. Morris (2000) identifies that the failures of protest “as a form of collective behavior, is that it becomes considered spontaneous, unorganized, unstructured phenomena that were discontinuous with institutional and organizational behavior” (445). Navalny’s lack of experience was critical in discrediting him within the larger Russian polity. Judah (2013) identifies that among his supporters and even within his general message there was no real outline to dictate how his policy would be different from those currently exercised by the Kremlin and there was no substance within his message.
Navalny’s lack of information and experience on Russian political system made his message less impactful among rational critics who despite supporting his move were increasingly skeptical of his long term meaning. Morris (2000) identifies that common aspects of collective behavior within revolutionary social movement show a direct link between emotional and non-rationality among participants. This is because they become dominated by mass hysteria and anger which is likely to propagate violence. This is the basis through which Putin and his government justified claims to limit Navalny through prosecution and attacking his character
Morris (2000) identifies that collective behavior, while successful in the past have become less appreciated by larger Western and European societies and the Russian society is one of them. Morris (2000) identifies that within the late 20th century, collectivist behavior that manifested in social movement had emerged become critical in propagating social and cultural breakdown across many societies in the world. Human agency under collectivist behaviors become the basis under which social movement manifest and take shape across society. The snow revolution, as a form of revolutionary social movement as such is conceptualized with high degree of uncertainty and at the same time radical. Under Aberie’s Four Types of Social Movements revolutionary social movements usually take encompass larger portions of the society, as such, come to harbor diverse human agency leading them to become more radical and likely to become distable to social, economic, political and cultural value system.
Figure 1: Aberle types of social movements [Retrieved from: https://courses.lumenlearning.com/boundless-sociology/chapter/social-movements/]
Navalny had little knowledge of the political establishment enough to create a ripple effect across the largest country in the world. Shuster (2012) identifies that Navalny had never held office or participated in any political party, he was neither rich, nor a media personality nor connected nor powerful. Majority of his power was gained was from the little region “he rules an entity that has only begun to discover its power–Russia’s political blogosphere–and has about 1.5 million readers of his own each month.” (35). His rise to power and prominence within the Russian scene was only something of a Hollywood feel good story for many within Russia opposed to Putin and his authoritarian regime as well as outsiders watching the story unfold. Navalny had no real grasp of power and his political campaign if anything were more of westernized that typical Russian political campaigns.
Navalny had no support from traditional opposition parties as wells as ethnic supported opposition movements which historically made up a sizeable percentage of Russian opposition groups. Earlier in his campaigns, Navalny had been quoted as a racist after spewing ethnic slurs on indigenous Russians (Tselikov, 2013). This is a factor that further desensitized many from his ideals as he became commonly viewed as a right wing politician, and a person not really appreciative of the dynamic and diverse 21st century Russian society. Through his remarks, Navalny becomes conceptualized, not as the real change, as such, he was unable to garner much support from across the country. Judah (2013) further points out that among his followers, Navalny was increasingly becoming viewed as the ONLY person able to fight Putin and in a sense, formed the foundation of “Big Man” image. His supporters were increasingly falling into a rabbit-hole trap of Big man Navalny that currently define Putin as such, in a way presents himself not as the real change but an alternative Putin.
The East Versus West Narrative Still Dominates Major Parts of the Russian Conscience
Unlike the older generation of Russians, the newer group understood that their existence was not to be defined under the conflict between the East and the West as was the case in the late 20th century for many older people who then were within the Soviet Union. The idea of the west vs Russia is something that continues to resonate among many who of the population alive and were participants in the Soviet Union era. This is a critical tool that has been used to maintain their support for Vladimir Putin and his cohorts in Kremlin. Lipman (2016) identifies that following Navalny’s rise, the Kremlin had started and undertook a major offensive against discrediting him and painting his documentary as a tool by American businessmen and a Russian liberal against the state of Russian for all it had achieved to stand above western ideals. Navalny is presented to his critics as anti-Russian in the sense that he is majorly supported by western media and western critics against the powerful state of Russian.
The fall of the Soviet Empire for many within Russia was a catastrophic aspect of geopolitical failure and a loss to the western ideal, a fact that still defines majority of Russian people perspectives and ideology. Anti-westernism per se, becomes a critical name to define the movement and ideals of people in support of Putin and his authoritarian regime. Lipman (2016) reiterates that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, many within Russia became very suspect if independent news and media outlet. Corruption and economic turmoil also led to the lack of trust of independent media as such state media was installed by the regime as a means to feed people propaganda and disinformation. Putin’s tough stance against corrupt governors compelled many to support him so as to avoid prosecution and most of the governors had ties with rich businessmen most who owned private media which were acquired (indirectly) for Kremlin’s bidding (now under Putin) (Lipman, 2016). With Kremlin’s domination on information circulation and also in shaping ideologies they created a perfect tool for the desensitization of the masses. Being the “owner” and having the capabilities to define the problem facing Russia, Putin and his regime slowly coined a new narrative and perspective of the problem under the symbolic social construction arena- media.
Navalny is largely a film maker with a keen eye on corruption in China. His followers are mainly on the internet, as will be discussed below. For many of his successes there are countless numbers of failures that can be attributed to his ideology and character. Lipman (2016) identifies that Putin used his failures to define him as a non-issue within the Russian political sphere and an outsider funded by the west to destabilize Russia. This is the basis under which Navalny has been numerously tried or put under house arrest or even forced to flee Russia. But his online presence was also the basis from which his ideals came to resonate with many Russian people. The power of the internet was critical in defining the potential for Navalny. McLuhan (1967) identifies that the medium becomes the message. This is a critical statement meant to imply the owner of the means becomes the one to shape the realities of many disillusioned by controlled information.
With the rise of internet access and increased decentralization of communication across a larger mass, Navalny has become able to reach many beyond his physical scope and allowed his message to resonate with many who feel marginalized by the corruption. Shuster (2012) identifies that prior to his meteoric rise, there was no real political competition within Russia as even some of the previously outspoken competitors had come to be extinct and majority of the policies undertaken by the Russian federation were neither new nor helpful for the 21st century. Stanovaya et al (2020) identifies that some of the key aspect that made Russian Federation standout in the West were the fact that it was sort of a quite swamp, resilient to changing western domination albeit stagnating economy throughout the western world’s rise in the late 20th century. Opposition to economic stagnation and increased corruption within the Kremlin regime, especially under Putin, was the key reason that many of Navalny’s followers had come to appreciate his antics and attack on corruption online.
The Internet’s Successes and The Youth of Russia
This is a key aspect that made Navalny standout, as he had managed to evade an assassination earlier and continued in his track online shaming and exposing corruption within the Putin Regime. Shuster (2012) identifies that Navalny attributed his success to the 76-82 effect, which represent the age of his average followers, most of which were in their 20s in 2011-13. They had become disillusioned and felt short changed by the authoritarian regime in Moscow. But why is understanding the demography important in understanding the failures of Alexei Navalny’s opposition movement in Russia? This is because it was majorly centered in urban areas, where the federation has little control and most of Navanly’s supporters were very delusional in their intention apart from their proclamation that Navalny was the only man capable of taking down Putin. Judah (2013) identifies that Navanly had proposed little of a change to warrant true leadership following behind, and had only become popular among his followers mainly for criticizing the regime. He did nothing critical to offer any change and was increasingly new to the Russian political system. Judah (2013) exclaims that 6 years prior to this movement only a small fraction of the Russian population had an idea of who Navalny was, and by 2014 40% of people across the federation had a rough idea, while in regions such as Moscow, up to 70% of the population knew him
Conclusion
For any political process to be successful, it is very important that the people heading the movement have a clear roadmap on what they need to achieve. Some of the lessons learned from other regions such as North Africa include the fact that the lack of a clear program only leads to failure or chaos in case the protests succeed. It is therefore important that this is put into consideration. While the Russian protests were designed to fight for the improvement of the democratic space, they failed to achieve anything substantial. Worse off, the government of the day conducted a widespread crackdown on the protestors including Navalny. As of today, Navalny, the opposition leader who was at the forefront of these protests is in prison. Vladamir Putin on the other hand still won the elections and continues to be the Russian leader. While the protests were seen as having been very successful, Putin put in place effective counteraction strategies that not only prevented any rise in public uproar but also saw him increase his popularity. Lessons from other regions show that protests that have largely been successful are those that have involved young people, convinced them on the importance of the movement and tapped into their energy. However, while Navalny was able to persuade the older generation, most of the young people especially those living in urban areas remained unswayed. With the internet having become an important tool for communication and interaction, successful protests should be able to harness into its power, and this means having young people on board. Lack of experience from the protests leader, Navalny was also another major factor that contributed to the failure of the protests. The fact that he lacked experience in public service and he had not held any office prior to the protests was an indication that he lacked proper understanding of the political formations. Furthermore, he did not get any support from the established political formations. This showed that despite the fact that the protests were designed to achieve a good cause for the country, it was designed for failure.
The Russian society in general lacks the political will to compel change, as majority of the country’s polity is still stuck in Soviet era nostalgia, only wanting a change in the market system and not in the political structure in general. This is why the revolution in Russia as compared to that in Ukraine was less attended, and was only highlighted in western regions of the country’s urban centers and mostly within the people in the middle class who have access to the internet and through globalization have become affected by western ideals of democracy. Nationalism as an ideology continues to grow but at a small rate as compared to countries such as Ukraine where majority of the people felt cheated by increased government corruption. Research indicates that waves of nationalism in Europe have always gone hand in hand with growth in democracy, and the same is happening in Russia but concentrated among a section of youths, online and most of whom reside in the urban centers. Another key reason for the failure in Russia, is the increased government interference in the general political discourse of the country’s general population.
News media are increasingly controlled by government officials, and for the most part, they are very intolerant to ideas that do not support their perspective. Lack of freedom within the general media has worked to undermine Navalny’s reach. For instance Navalny was not permitted to appear in major media houses and his message was only constricted. This allowed his message to have limited reach as such, only limit his growth to urban centers such as Moscow. The government in Moscow also has enormous resources and propaganda, remains to be a central tool for manipulation of the masses. This together with the corruption of the law enforcement has greatly played a role stifling the voice of the opposition. Most opposition supporters and leaders have expressed their displeasure in the system, and have also been intimidated by the same system that is supposed to protect them. Navalny’s intimidation, for the most part worked in the opposite direction as it brought more people to the streets in his support.
But one of the most important reason why the protest failed is because they lacked better leadership founded on better ideals than the current ones dominating the Russian political psyche. Navalny as an individual has been cited to be a doer and not a thinker. One of his critics, viewed his entry similar to Hitler, in Nazi Germany era as it riled the middle class xenophobic trends that had been suppressed under the current administration. Navalny had a great agenda but it lacked an ideological background. Navalny’s character for the most part was his major undoing, without an adequate theoretical construction of ideas, Navalny was only conceptualized as an alternative to the current strongman with another. As such, majority of the Russian public failed to align themselves with his ideas owing to his past political rhetoric as well as the general lack of a strong foundation.
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